Multicasting is becoming an increasingly important and desired form of communication on the Internet, not surprisingly because its typical applications include audioand video conferencing 4]. Providing security services, such as tra c con dentiality, for multicast communication is particularly problematic, since it involves securely distributing a group key to each of a group's receivers.
In this paper we describe not only how the CBT multicast architecture can provide for the secure joining of a CBT group tree, but also how this same process can be augmented to provide a scalable solution to the multicast key distribution problem. These securityrelated services are integral in the CBT protocol 2, 3] . Their use is optional, which is dependent on each individual group's requirement for security. Furthermore, the use of the CBT multicast protocol for multicast key distribution does not preclude the use of other multicast protocols for the actual multicast communication itself.
Secure joining implies the provision for authentication, integrity, and optionally, condentiality, of CBT join messages. In short, our scheme serves to authenticate tree nodes (routers) and receivers (end-systems) as part of the tree joining process.
Existing network layer multicast protocols, such as DVMRP 7] and M- OSPF 9] , have no provisions for security features { indeed, any security implemented for these protocols would need to be implicit in the network layer protocol itself, i.e. IP. The same applies to PIM, a new multicast protocol proposal 14] . This is because these multicast protocols are integral to the IP protocol, unlike CBT which is its own network layer protocol 1 with its own header. Furthermore, the \connection-oriented" approach adopted by CBT complements security well for reasons we explain below (see section 3).
The CBT security architecture is independent of any particular cryptotechniques, although many security services, such as authentication, are easier if public-key cryptotechniques are employed. A more detailed discussion of why public-key cryptotechniques are more suited to multicast is given in 1].
What follows is an overview of the CBT multicasting. The description of our proposal in section 5 assumes the reader is reasonably familiar with the CBT protocol. Details of the CBT protocol can be found in 3, 2].
Overview of CBT Multicasting
CBT is a new architecture for local and wide-area IP multicasting, being unique in its utilization of just one shared delivery tree per group, as opposed to the source-based delivery tree approach of existing IP multicast schemes, such as DVMRP 7] and MOSPF 10] .
The CBT protocol is built so as to re ect the CBT architecture, just described. This architecture allows for the enhancement of the scalability of the multicast algorithm, in terms of group-speci c state maintained in the network, particularly for the case where there are many active senders in a particular group. The CBT architecture o ers an improvement in scalability over existing techniques by a factor of the number of active sources (where a source is a subnetwork aggregate). Hence, a core-based architecture allows us to signi cantly improve the overall scaling factor of S N we have in the sourcebased tree architecture, to just N. This is the result of having just one multicast tree per group as opposed to one tree per (source, group) pair.
The shared multicast delivery tree is built around several so-called core routers. Group receivers are required to explicitly join the corresponding delivery tree by requesting a local router to send a join message to one of the group's core routers. The resulting acknowledgement traverses the reverse-path of the join, resulting in the creation of tree branches. Routers along these branches are called non-core routers for the group, and there exists a parent-child relationship between adjacent non-core routers for the same group.
Unlike most existing IP multicast schemes, CBT is not data driven, i.e. tree state is xed in the routers that make up the tree. This so-called \hard state" remains in the routers until either the tree (or part of it) is explictly torn down, or there is a network failure, in which case the on-tree router that has lost connectivity with its parent will try to re-connect itself to the delivery tree.
3 How the CBT Architecture Complements Security Soft state source based multicast schemes, such as DVMRP and M-OSPF, do not lend themselves well to security implementations. The reason for this can be extracted from two independent properties of existing IP multicast schemes: a multicast delivery tree only exists as long as there is data ow, i.e. there is no explicit multicast tree set up; a router receiving a multicast packet has does not necessarily know the previous-hop router that forwarded it, and therefore, the forwarding router (previous-hop) can not be authenticated. All a receiving router can be sure of is the interface over which a multicast arrived. The CBT architecture, on the other hand, does not su er from this problem. CBT's \connection-oriented" approach means that all routers that make up a delivery tree know who their on-tree neighbours are, and these neighbours are authenticated as part of tree set-up. As part of secure tree set-up, neighbours could exchange a secret packet handle for inclusion in the CBT header of data packets exchanged between those neighbours, allowing for the simple and e cient hop-by-hop authentication of data packets (on-tree).
The presence of tree focal points (i.e. cores) gives a CBT tree a natural authorization point in a security sense { the formation of a CBT tree requires the core to acknowledge at least one join in order for a tree branch to be formed. This authorization capability can be passed on to joining nodes that are veri ed.
In terms of security, the \connection-oriented" approach of CBT o ers several additional advantages: once a multicast tree is established, tree state maintained in the routers that make up the tree does not time out nor change necessarily to re ect underlying unicast topology. The implications of this with regards to security, are that nodes need not be subject to repeated authentication subsequent to a period of inactivity, nor must tree nodes re-authenticate themselves as a result of an underlying unicast topology change, unless of course, an on-tree node failure has occurred.
\Hard-state" protocol mechanisms are often thought of as being less fault tolerant than soft-state schemes. However, in the case of CBT we have built a high level of fault tolerance into the protocol, for example, by using multiple cores per tree to increase robustness, and by having various tree re-building and re-con guration mechanisms.
The Multicast Key Distribution Problem
We believe that multicast key distribution needs to be combined with group access control. Without group access control, there is no point in employing multicast key distribution, since, if there are no group restrictions, then it should not matter to whom multicast information is divulged.
Group access control requires identifying one group member (we suggest in 1] that this should be the group initiator) who has the ability to create, modify and delete all or part of a group access control list. The enforcement of group access control may be done by a network entity external to the group, or by a group member.
The essential problem of distributing a session (or group) key to a group of multicast receivers lies in the fact that some central key management entity, such as a key distribution centre (KDC) 2 , must authenticate each of a group's receivers, as well as securely distribute the session key to each of them. This involves encrypting the relevant message n times, once with each secret key shared between the KDC and corresponding receiver, before multicasting it to the group 3 . Potentially, n may be very large. Using public key encryption for distributing group keys is not an option, since the group key would be accessible to anyone holding the source's public key, and public keys are either well-known or readily available. In short, existing multicast key distribution methods do not scale.
There is very little published work to date on multicast key distribution. The reason for this is that, until now, no method has been devised that can achieve low-cost, scalable multicast key distribution.
Very recently a proposal has emerged, called the Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) 12]. This was designed for military networks, but the authors have demonstrated how the architecture could be applied to a network like the Internet, running receiveroriented multicast applications.
GKMP goes a considerable way to addressing the problems of multicast key distribution: it does not rely on a centralised KDC, but rather places the burden of key management on a group member(s). This is the approach adopted by the CBT solution, but our solution takes this distributed approach considerably further, which makes our scheme that much more scalable. Furthermore, our scheme is relatively simple.
The disadvantages of GKMP include: the requirement of hosts to hold permission certi cates { these are akin to capability lists. This implies certi cate management, and the one-to-many distribution of certi cates to hosts. In the CBT model, multicast certi cates, which are access control lists, are managed centrally by Authorization Servers, which provide similar functionality; for very large networks, GKMP requires additional GKMP management nodes that provide for key management and distribution. In CBT, this functionality is automatically \passed on" to a node when that node joins the tree; the GKMP management application must initially distribute a key package to each member individually, requiring each group member to engage in a secure protocol exchange with the group manager, which involves authentication. This requires the group manager to transmit securely a key package to each member. This is a serious drawback of GKMP, and, whilst it has moved key management functionality away from a centralised KDC, the burden of n secure transmissions from any network entity is unattractive and imposes certain performance requirements on such management entities.
The CBT model for multicast key distribution is unique in that it is integrated into the CBT multicast protocol itself. It o ers a simple, low-cost, scalable solution to multicast key distribution. We describe the CBT multicast key distribution approach below.
The CBT Multicast Key Distribution Model
The security architecture we propose allows not only for the secure joining of a CBT tree, but also doubles in providing a solution to the multicast key distribution problem 8]. This is achievable as an implicit and integral part of the secure tree joining process. If a group session key is not required, its distribution may be omitted. Key distribution does not incur any extra message overhead, although its presence will increase message size slightly.
The use of CBT for scalable multicast key distribution does not preclude the use of other multicast protocols for subsequent multicast data communication. CBT could be used solely for multicast key distribution { any multicast protocol could be used for the actual multicast communication itself.
How a group key is used depends on the security requirements and the sensitivity of the tra c. Tra c between a group's receivers could be encrypted, or multicast data could include a digital signature (or MIC). The parameters for any cryptotechniques implemented are obtained in the secure CBT tree joining process.
In a large internetwork it is not practical to have a centralised KDC { such a model does not scale. In the context of multicast communication, the problem is compounded by the need for new members to explicitly request the group key from the KDC, which must authenticate each requestor with the aid of a group access control list (ACL). The group ACL is transmitted securely to the KDC by one group member (probably the group initiator). If a requestor is veri ed by the KDC, it securely transmits the group key to the new receiver.
The model that we propose does not rely on the presence of a centralised KDC { indeed, the KDC we propose need not be dedicated to key distribution. We are proposing that each group have its own group key distribution centre (GKDC), and that the functions it provides should be able to be \passed on" to other nodes as they join the tree. Hence, our scheme involves truly distributed key distribution capability, and is therefore scalable. It does not require dedicated KDCs. We are proposing that a CBT core initially take on the rôle of a GKDC.
Operational Overview
When a CBT group is initiated, it is the group initiator's responsibility to create a multicast access control list (see 1]). It subsequently securely transmits the list to the primary core for the group by including the list in the CBT-CORE-NOTIFICATION 4 message { we are advocating that the cores of a CBT tree take on the initial rôle of GKDCs. The group initiator need not create a group session key, rather, the primary core for the group creates it subsequent to receiving, and verifying, the message containing the access control list.
The primary core also creates a key encrypting key (KEK) which is used for re-keying the group just prior to an old key exceeding its lifetime. This re-keying strategy means that an active key is less likely to become compromised during its lifetime. Re-keying may also be necessary to exclude a group member who has become unauthorized within a group for one reason or another.
The access control list, group key, and KEK are distributed to each of the other cores (as well as any other intermediate CBT routers) as part of the initial tree set-up (i.e. backbone set-up) phase, which occurs \securely". The access control list, group key, and KEK are disemminated to other tree nodes as they join the tree.
Any tree node with this information can verify a joining member, and hence, secure tree joining and multicast session key distribution are truly distributed across already veri ed tree nodes.
Example { Integrated Join Veri cation and Multicast Key Distribution
For simplicity, in our example we assume the presence of an internetwork-wide public key management scheme, such as that proposed in 6]. However, we are not precluding the use of symmetric cryptographic techniques { all of the security services we are proposing, i.e. integrity, authentication, and con dentiality, can all be achieved using symmetric cryptography, albeit at a greater expense: e.g. negotiation with a third party to establish pairwise secret keys. For these reasons, we assume that a public key management scheme is globally available, for example, through the Domain Name System (DNS) 6] or World Wide Web (WWW) 11].
The terminology we use here is described in the appendix to this paper. However, we formally de ne some additional terms here: grpKey: group key used for encrypting group data tra c. ACL: group access control list (for contents, see 1]). KEK: key encrypting key, used for re-keying a group with a new group key. group access package (grpAP): sent from an already veri ed tree node to an adjacent joining node. token sender ; ACL; fgrpKey; KEKg PK origin?host ; fgrpKey; KEKg PK next?hop ] SK sender As we have already stated, the elected primary core of a CBT tree takes on the initial rôle of GKDC. In our example, we assume that a group access control list has already been securely communicated to the primary core, that the primary core { as a result of receiving the group's ACL, has created a group key and a key-encrypting key, and nally, that any secondary cores have joined the primary core, thereby forming the backbone, or core tree. Therefore, all routers along the tree's backbone have e ectively become GKDCs for the group.
Rather than demonstrate how the routers along the core tree become GKDCs, due to the similarity, it should su ce to describe how a host securely joins a CBT tree (i.e. group), and how CBT routers along a particular tree branch are given GKDC capability. This is what we describe as the integrated CBT secure joining and multicast key distribution process.
In the diagram below, host h is joining the multicast group G. By some means, h knows that the topologically nearest core is C, and therefore requests its local designated router (DR), A, which has not yet joined the tree, to target a JOIN-REQUEST at C. As part of host h's joining process, it sends a special CBT message (CBT-TAG-REPORT) to the local DR (router A), containing the address of a core router to which it wishes a tree branch to be created from the DR. This message invokes A to send a JOIN-REQUEST. Contained within the message is h's token 5 Local designated router (DR) A veri es the complete message, and the token received from h. On successful veri cation, A generates a JOIN-REQUEST which includes its own unsigned token, and the token of h, which is signed by h. This join is digitally 5 A host's token di ers in two respects compared with tokens generated by routers. To refresh, a token assists a recipient in the veri cation process, and typically contains: recipient's unique identity, a timestamp, and a pseudo-random number. A token is also usually digitally signed by its originator.
Firstly, A host's token does not contain the intended recipient's identity, since this token may need to traverse several CBT routers before reaching a GKDC. A host does not actually know which router, i.e. GKDC, will actually acknowledge the join that it invoked.
Secondly, the host's token is digitally signed { this is usual for a token. However, tokens generated by routers need not be explicitly digitally signed because the JOIN-REQUESTs and JOIN-ACKs that carry them are themselves digitally signed.
signed by A and sent to the best next-hop on the path to the core (C). The best next-hop in our example is router B.
A ?! B : ftoken A g; ftoken h g SK h ; JOIN ? REQUEST] SK A B rst veri es A's JOIN-REQUEST. On successful veri cation, B repeats the above step, except the join is sent from B to C, the core, which happens to be the next-hop. Also, the token included in the join is that of B. h is not veri ed by B. h's token is copied to this new join.
B ?! C : ftoken B g; ftoken h g SK h ; JOIN ? REQUEST] SK B C authenticates B's join. As the tree's primary authorization point (and GKDC), C also authenticates the host, h, that triggered the join process, provided h is included in the GKDC's access control list 1] for the group. If h is not in the corresponding access control list, authentication is redundant, and a JOIN-NACK is returned from C to B, which eventually reaches h's local DR, A.
Once B and h have been veri ed, C forms a group access package (grpAP), which includes C's token, and encapsulates it in a JOIN-ACK. Two (group key, KEK) pairs are included in the group access package, one for the originating host, and one for the next-hop CBT router to which the JOIN-ACK is destined. The host key pair is encrypted using the public key of the originating host, so as to be only decipherable by the originating host, and the other key pair is encrypted using the public key of the next-hop router to which the ACK is destined { in this case, B. The access control list may be encrypted 6 by C so as to be only decipherable by B, if con dentiality of the list is required. Finally, host h's signed token is included in the message to B. The token is used by the router connected to the subnet where h resides so as to be able to identify the key-requesting host, i.e. new member. C ?! B : ftoken h g SK h ; grpAP; JOIN ? ACK] SK C B authenticates the JOIN-ACK received from C. On successful veri cation, B extracts its encrypted key pair 7 from the group access package and stores it. It also stores the included access control list in an appropriate table. The originating host key pair remains enciphered.
A copy of the router's key pair is taken and deciphered using its secret key, and immediately enciphered with the public key of next-hop to which a JOIN-ACK must be passed, i.e. router A. A group access package is formulated by B for A. It contains B's token, the group ACL (which may be optionally encrypted using the public key of A), a (group key, KEK) pair encrypted using the public key of A, and the originating host's key pair, already encrypted. The group access package is encapsulated in a JOIN-ACK, which is digitally signed, and forwarded to A. B ?! A : ftoken h g SK h ; grpAP; JOIN ? ACK] SK B A veri es the JOIN-ACK received from B. The encrypted key pair that is for itself is extracted from the group access package and stored as is. The included access control list is stored in an appropriate table. The key pair encrypted for h is extracted from the group access package, and is forwarded directly to host h, which is identi ed from the presence of h's signed token. On receipt, host h decrypts the key pair for subsequent use.
A ?! h : ftoken h g SK h ; fgrpKey; KEKg PK h ] Going back to the initial step of the tree-joining procedure, if the DR for the group being joined by host h were already established as part of the corresponding tree, it would already be a GKDC. It would therefore be able to directly pass the group key and KEK to host h after receiving a CBT-TAG-REPORT from h:
A ?! h : ftoken h g SK h ; fgrpKey; KEKg PK h ] If paths, or nodes fail, a new route to a core is gleaned as normal from the underlying unicast routing table, and the re-joining process (see 2, 3] ) occurs in the same secure fashion.
Summary
This paper has o ered a scalable solution to the multicast key distribution problem. Our solution is based on the CBT architecture and protocol, but this should not preclude the use of other multicast protocols for secure multicast communication subsequent to key distribution. Furthermore, virtually all of the functionality present in our solution is inbuilt in the secure version of the CBT protocol, and therefore multicast key distribution is (optionally) an integral part of the CBT protocol.
